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THE CHANGING IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS IN THE AMERICAN CAPITAL MARKETt
CGuums H. ScHMvmT* AND ELEANOR J. STOCKWELL *
Institutional investors have come to play an increasingly important role in the
American capital or long-term investment fund market. Over the past 30 years, the
combined resources of life and property insurance companies, mutual savings banks,
and savings and loan associations, together with the investments of the commercial
banking system, increased from 3o billion to 225 billion dollars. During this same
period, the proportion of total public and private real estate mortgage and long-term
corporate debt held by these institutions rose to one-half from somewhat less than
one-third. If public and private self-insured pension and retirement funds and
trust departments of commercial banks are also included, the proportion of public
and long-term private debt held at the present time by institutional, as contrasted
with individual, investors is even greater.
Social and economic developments since 192o have encouraged the growth of insti-
tutional investors to the point where they now represent a dominant force in the
capital market. By accepting funds from numerous individuals, including those who
save only very modest amounts, institutional investors have established a sizable pool
of long-term investment funds into which new savings are continually being added
and through which funds obtained from the repayment of outstanding loans flow
into new investment outlets.
While the nation-wide operations of many of these institutional investors have
imparted a mobility to investment funds that has gone far toward offsetting excess
demand in some areas of the country against over-supply in others, statutory and
supervisory restrictions to which most of these institutions are subject have largely
limited long-term financing to various forms of debt, as contrasted with equity,
capital. At the same time, institutional investors have taken the initiative for de-
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veloping new forms of debt financing that are particularly suited to the specialized
needs of business concerns.
As the first of a series on the subject of institutional investors in the capital
market, this article describes the function and structure of the capital market, the
underlying social and economic developments which have contributed to the growing
importance of institutional investors in that market, the investment characteristics
of certain types of institutions, and their investment activities during the period
1920-50. Subsequent articles deal more fully with the economic and legal factors
-which govern the investment activities of major classes of institutional investors.
I
Tim AMEcAN CAPITAL MARKET: ITS FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE
The capital market performs a vital economic function in supplying, out of cur-
rent or previously accumulated savings, or on occasions through credit expansion,
long-term or investment funds needed by various public and private users. Both its
structure and operation are complex, since it consists of numerous individuals, insti-
tutions, governments, and private businesses, some of which function alternatively as
suppliers or users of investment funds, and some of which, while serving primarily
as financial intermediaries, exert a marked influence on the forms, terms, and
conditions of investment funds. Moreover, the direction, magnitude, and character of
the flow of such funds through the capital market are subject to pronounced changes
from time to time as the demand for and supply of investment funds are modified by
social, legal and economic developments.
A. Demand for long-term funds
Among the public users of long-term funds are domestic and foreign govern-
ments, both national and state or provincial; among the private users are domestic
and foreign business concerns, educational, charitable and other non-profit institu-
tions, and individuals. Relative demands of these groups vary markedly from one
time to another; under certain conditions, such as war or depression, public users
may completely overshadow, even to the point of excluding, private users. At other
times, particularly in periods of large business expenditures on new plant and equip-
ment or substantial construction and purchase of individual housing, private demands
for long-term funds may dominate the capital market.
Over the past 30 years, as is shown in Table I, the proportions as well as the
dollar amounts of public and long-term private debt outstanding have varied sub-
stantially.' In 193o, for example, public users accounted for one-fourth and private
users for three-fourths of the total of 126 billion dollars of such outstanding debt;
by the end of i95o, public users accounted for over two-thirds, and private users
for less than one-third, of a total which had grown, largely as a result of economic
depression and war, to 414 billion dollars.
' Long-term debt, as shown in Table z, includes all federal and state and local government and real
estate mortgage debt, and corporate debt having an original maturity of one year or more from date of
issue and held by others than affiliates.
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TABLE I. OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC AND LONG-TERM PRIVATE DEBT
AiOUNT, IN BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS PER CENT
Item
1920 1930 1940 1950 1920 1930 1940 1950
Public and long-term private debt, total'.. 86 126 150 414 100 100 100 100
Public ............................ 30 32 72 289 35 26 48 70
Private ............................ 55 93 78 125 65 74 52 30
Holdings of public and private long-term
debt, total ........................... 85 126 150 414 100 100 100 100
Financial institutions, total ............ 42 75 106 800 49 59 71 72
Insurance carriers .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 16 25 61 8 12 17 15
Savings depositories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 18 16 39 9 14 11 9
Commercial banking system4 . . . . . . . . .  12 22 32 109 14 17 21 26
Public pension and trust funds ...... 1 2 10 46 1 2 7 11
Private pension and trust funds6 ..... 7 7 1 5 s 8 1 1
Trust departments, commercial banks9  15 17 22 39 18 14 15 9
Other, total .......................... 48 51 44 141 51 41 29 28
Nonfinancial corporations 0 ... . . . . . .  3  2  20  2 1 5Individual and other"1 ....... i...... 4 91.42 195 51 38 28 23
'Public debt comprises gross direct and guaranteed obligations of the Federal Government and its agencies and long-term state and
local government debt exclusive of that held in sinking funds; private debt comprises net long-term corporate debt and real estate mort-
gages. Source Bonnell, Public and Prirafe Debt in 1950, SUevEY oF CURENe Busmess (U. S. Department of Commerce, September
1951). Public debt fiturcs for 1920 are partly estimated by authors from U. S. Treasury Department data.
2Life and property insurance companies; derived from Table 2.
Mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and the Postal Savings System; derived from Table 2, and FEDERAL RE-
sEnvR BULLETIN.
4All commercial and Federal Reserve Banks; derived from Table 2.
SFederal agency and trust funds and state and local trust and investment funds. Source-U. S. Treasury Department.GSelf-iusured private pension plans. Federal Reserve estimates, based on Deportment of Commerce and other data.7Lcss than $500,000,000.
Lem than % of 1 per cent.
Teatative estimates, based on reports of state banking departments and the Comptroller of the Currency.
iOSource-U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Treasury Department.
,'Residual: comprises individuals, unincorporated businesses, foundations and endowments, foreign holdings, security dealers, and
others.
Note: Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
I. Public demand for long-term funds.
Except for the period of the twenties, when foreign governments marketed a sub-
stantial volume of securities in this country, public demand on the American capital
market has reflected almost entirely the needs of federal, state and local govern-
ments. What distinguishes Federal Government borrowing from private, and to a
certain extent from state and local government, borrowing is the fact that a large
part of the financing covers operating rather than capital expenditures. Also, Fed-
eral Government borrowing does not result in many self-liquidating projects; to the
extent that funds for federal debt repayment become available they are obtained
from general tax revenues, and unless such revenues exceed current operating ex-
penses the amount of funds so available may be negligible. Largely because of the
varying liquidity and portfolio needs of holders of Government securities, a sub-
stantial part of Federal Government borrowing is done through debt instruments of
relatively short maturity, despite the fact that the debt may be essentially long-term
in character.
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State and local governments do not make any extensive use of short-maturity obli-
gations for financing such long-term requirements for funds as schools, hospitals,
highways, bridges, port improvement projects, and water, sewage disposal and recre-
ational facilities. Instead, they float bonds of extended though sometime of serial
maturity that compete with long-term private and Federal Government obligations.
In one respect, however, state and local government securities have a competitive ad-
vantage: they are wholly exempt from federal income and excess profits taxes.
2. Private demand for -long-term funds.
Depending upon over all economic conditions and other factors, private long-term
credit demands also vary markedly from one period to another and generally, though
not always, in inverse relationship to those of the Federal Government. Thus, dur-
ing World War II, when the Federal Government obtained over 2oo billion dollars
from the capital market, corporations and individuals together actually repaid almost
7 billion dollars of their outstanding debt. In the postwar period 1946-5o, however,
private long-term credit demands totalled nearly 54 billion dollars, compared with
Federal Government debt repayment of 34 billion.
The principal long-term financing requirements of businesses are determined by
their needs for plant and equipment, for more or less permanent expansion of work-
ing capital, and for refunding outstanding indebtedness. Consequently, business
demands on the capital market reflect such factors as: the current and prospective
level of consumer demand, technological developments and competitive forces, gen-
eral price levels and the relative costs of debt and equity capital, and the availability
of funds from alternative external and internal sources. During the past 30 years
aggregate business demand for long-term funds has varied markedly from one period
to another; likewise, the character of the demand has altered with changes in tax
laws and the growing institutionalization of investment funds. In the case of corpo-
rations, the growth in corporate income taxes and the tax-exempt status of some
financial institutions encouraged debt, as contrasted to equity, financing. Since most
institutional investors supply debt rather than equity funds to the capital market,
and since debt capital has in recent years cost less than equity capital, there is a
natural tendency for business concerns to seek funds from these sources. Moreover,
the tax-exempt status of life insurance companies has encouraged the development of
such financing arrangements as the purchase-lease agreement.
Long-term credit requirements of individuals are confined primarily to the pur-
chase of farms, houses, and business properties, and are generally handled on the basis
of real estate mortgages on business or residential property. Such demands custo-
marily vary with economic conditions, and in the case of residential property, more
specifically with the rate of new house construction.
B. Sources of long-term funds
The principal source of long-term or investment funds is current saving, as repre-
sented by individuals' income in excess of expenses, business retained earnings, and
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government operating surpluses. From time to time the supply of loanable funds
may be supplemented by an inflow of investment funds from abroad, by the tapping
of idle cash holdings, or by bank credit expansion.
Of these various sources, savings of individuals are by far the most important.
Since the major share of business savings is reinvested in plant and equipment or
working capital, only those amounts used to purchase Government securities or
advanced on a long-term basis to other businesses may be regarded as funds generally
available to the investment market. The Federal Government also supplies long-
term funds to the capital market in a limited sense only, namely, through debt retire-
ment in excess of new borrowing, such as occurred during the twenties. More re-
cently, however, the Federal Government has on the whole been a net user rather
than a supplier of savings, its receipts having exceeded its expenditures in only a few
years. State and local governments, in addition to retiring debt, provide some funds
to the capital market through the purchase of securities for their pension and retire-
ment funds. In the early years of American economic development, and as late as the
twenties, a substantial volume of foreign capital was invested in this country; in
recent years foreign investors have been withdrawing funds.
On certain occasions, investment funds have been provided through the credit
creation powers of the commercial banking system. During World War II, for
example, the Federal Government obtained a substantial volume of funds in this
manner. Ordinarily, however, such credit expansion is more important as a source
of short-term than of long-term investment funds.
While savings by individuals remain today, as they have been during most of the
past 30 years, the primary source of long-term investment funds, a growing pro-
portion of such savings has flowed into the market via financial institutions, including
insurance carriers, savings institutions, public and private pension trust funds, and
commercial banks. Between i92o and i95o, as is shown in Table i, the proportion of
public and long-term private debt held by institutional investors of one type or an-
other rose from about one-half to nearly three-fourths of the total, while the pro-
portion held by individuals and other non-institutional investors declined by a like
amount.
II
FAcTORs RESPONSIBLE FOR GRowTH oF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
The growing institutionalization of investment funds reflects a number of factors,
among the more important of which are (I) the promotional activities of institutions
themselves, which have encouraged habits of thrift and more widespread insurance
against risks of death, property destruction, and accidental loss, (2) the greater
emphasis on financial security on the part of individuals, particularly since the de-
pression of the thirties, which has been reflected in the growth in pension and re-
tirement programs and has given further impetus to saving in such forms as life
insurance and bank deposits, (3) the redistribution of individual incomes, which has
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increased the relative importance of savings by lower income groups who consider
life insurance, deposits in savings and loan associations and banks, and purchases of
Series E bonds preferable to direct investment in corporate bonds and stocks, and (4)
increases in individual and corporate income taxes and individual estate and inheri-
tance taxes, which have altered the savings habits of upper income groups.
A. Activities of institutional investors
All types of financial institutions have actively encouraged thrift and insurance
against loss of life or property, and have provided services that attract the savings of
individuals. Their promotional activities range from the establishment of school or
Christmas savings clubs to the provision of specialized insurance and annuity plans.
In the case of life insurance companies intensive sales efforts, combined with a grow-
ing awareness on the part of individuals of the need for protection against loss of
earning power, have resulted in a tremendous growth in the volume of outstanding
insurance. In each of the past 5 decades except that of the thirties, the volume of life
insurance in force in the United States has more than doubled, rising from roughly
9 billion dollars in i9oo to 242 billion in x950.2
An intangible, but nonetheless important factor contributing to the growth of
institutionalized saving is the increased public confidence in such institutions that
has resulted from a more strictly supervised but more flexible banking system, the
insurance of bank deposits, and the increased responsibilities to the public assumed
by all types of financial institutions.
B. Increased emphasis on financial security
The stock market crash of 1929 and the prolonged depression of the thirties have
had a pronounced effect on the forms which peoples' savings take, as individuals
have sought for themselves and the government has sought for its citizens, greater
protection against future financial vicissitudes. Voluntary savings in the form of
life insurance and annuities have increased substantially relative to direct invest-
ment in common stocks, which are viewed with distrust by many individuals. In-
voluntary savings, as represented by contributions to pension and unemployment
compensation funds, are already substantial and are growing at a rapid rate.
Some forms of retirement and social insurance funds, such as the Federal Civil
Service Retirement fund and those of a few large corporations, have been in exist-
ence for a number of years, but the large-scale development of Federal Social
Security and private pension funds is of comparatively recent origin. Total re-
sources of federal social insurance and private pension funds other than those ad-
ministered by life insurance companies increased by roughly 35 billion dollars
during the forties, as compared with less than 8 billion during the thirties and only
i billion during the twenties.
'LiuE .INsuRANcE FACT BoOK (Institute of Life Insurance, New York, x95).
INSTITUTIONAL INVsTORS IN AmEICAN CAPITAL MARKETS 9
C. Redistribution of individual income and savings
Prior to 1920, a substantial part of all long-term funds was provided directly by
well-to-do individuals. During the period since 1920, and particularly since I93O, the
role of such individuals has diminished, partly as a result of a redistribution of in-
come. It is estimated that between 193o and 1945 the proportion of total disposable
income (net income after federal income taxes) received by the top 5 per cent of
income recipients declined from 30 per cent to 17 per cent.3 Over the same period,
the average income of the top 5 per cent changed relatively little, while that of the
lower 95 per cent more than doubled. These contrasting movements reflect both
the effect of the progressive income tax on higher incomes and the increased income
of wage-earning groups which has accompanied their improved bargaining power
and greater productivity.
While the bulk of all savings is still supplied by the upper income group, the
failure of its disposable income to keep pace with the growing demand for long-
term funds has resulted in greater reliance upon savings of the lower income group.
Since savings habits and preferences of upper and lower income groups differ sub-
stantially, this redistribution of income has materially altered the channels through
which savings find their way into investment, and the forms in which long-term
funds are made available.
Although total savings of lower income groups represent a substantial volume of
funds, the aggregates consist of small savings by many individuals, the greater
part of which arise through contributions to social security and other pension funds,
or through contractual repayment of mortgage debt. Except in the highest income
classes, the amount of savings left over after these involuntary and contractual de-
ductions must be small, not only in dollar terms but also relative to the individual's
total income, since, as shown by the 1951 Survey of Consumer Finances, 3 out of
every 4 spending units with income before taxes of less than $5,ooo saved less than
io per cent of their total income in 15o. The smaller the proportion of his income
an individual is able to save, the less risk he is able to assume and the greater his
desire for liquidity and security is likely to be. For example, 8o per cent of income
recipients in the $3,ooo-$4,o0o income class prefer assets of unchanging money
value.5 Consequently, any residual savings of the lower income groups are usually
deposited in savings and loan associations and savings banks or used for the purchase
of life insurance and Government Series E bonds. Except for Government bonds,
these groups make practically no direct investment in long-term debt securities, nor
do they purchase common stocks despite the high return that such securities have
yielded in recent years.
oSmN KuZNETS, SHAtRis os UPPER INCOME GRouPs iN INcOME AND SAVINGS (Occasional Paper
No. 35, National Bureau of Economic Research, x95o).
'1951 Survey of Consumer Finances: Part IV, Distribution of Consumer Saving in X950, 37 FaD.
REs. BULL. Xo6i-1078 (Sept. 1951)-
1951 Survey of Consumer Finances: Part I, The Economic Outlook and Liquil Asset Position of
Consumers, id. at 627-644.
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D. Changes in income, inheritance and estate taxes
An increasing burden of federal and state income taxes and estate and inheritance
taxes has profoundly influenced the savings and investment preferences of indi-
viduals, and in so doing has facilitated the growth of institutional investors.
The upper income group, in which savings are greatest relative to income and
which accounts for the bulk of direct investment by individuals in government and
business securities, is the one whose relative tax burden has increased the most since
i92o. In the case of income taxes, the effect of the graduated normal and surtax rates
has been to cut the after-tax yield on taxable investment income in the upper tax
brackets to a nominal rate and to greatly increase the relative attractiveness of tax-
exempt state and local government securities. For example, a married person with
no dependents and an income of $ioooo, all of which was earned by one spouse
would, under the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948, have to obtain a return be-
fore tax of 3.0 per cent to realize the same yield after tax as from a 2.5 per cent tax-
exempt security A similar individual with an income of $5o,ooo would have to
receive a before-tax return of 3.8 per cent, while a person in the $200,000 income
bracket would require 6.I per cent. With the higher income tax rates now in effect,
before-tax returns would need to be even higher to equal tax-exempt yields.
While income tax considerations favor purchase of tax-exempt state and local
government bonds in preference to taxable business and Federal Government securi-
ties, well-to-do individuals may and do take advantage of the lower capital gains
tax rates by obtaining investment return through appreciation in market value of
securities. The higher risks attendant upon the realization of capital gains tend to
restrict the amount of such investment, however, with the result that even among
the upper income group an increasing volume of funds has been diverted into the
purchase of annuity and endowment policies.
Present high levels of estate and inheritance taxes have also influenced the in-
vestment preferences of individuals and the growth of institutional investors by en-
couraging the establishment of trusts in order to take advantage of the more favor-
able tax treatment which they are accorded.
III
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: Txmu FuNCTIONS AND INVESTMENT POLICIES
The investment or capital market activities of institutional investors are largely
determined by their functions, the statutory and supervisory restrictions to which
they are subject, and the extent and character of their liabilities. Some, like invest-
ment companies, do little more than invest or reinvest funds to yield the maximum
return consistent with the degree of risk permitted or assumed, and have no con-
tractual obligation requiring repayment of the principal upon demand or contingency.
Some, like property insurance companies, assume a contingent liability which may
'JoINT COMMITTEE PRINT, FACTORS ArrEcTING VOLUME AND STABILITY OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT 156
81st Cong., ist Sess. (949).
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or may not result in actual payments to policyholders. Others, including mutual
savings banks, savings and loan associations, and life insurance companies, are true
financial intermediaries, accepting deposits or premiums, assuming definite repay-
ment obligations, and investing the funds in such manner as to assure repayment
upon demand or contingency and to provide the maximum yield consistent with pro-
tection of principal.
While statutory and supervisory investment restrictions have been devised for
the protection of policyholders and depositors, there is some question as to how
accurately they reflect the true character of institutional liability or changing con-
cepts of investment value. Institutions which are not confronted with sudden with-
drawal demands could well afford to put greater emphasis upon prospective yield,
and less upon short-run market value, than many statutes or supervisory authorities
will permit or than many such institutions seem willing to do. For example, it was
not until 1951 that New York State statutes were revised to permit life insurance
companies operating in that state to invest up to 3 per cent of their assets in better
quality common stocks.7 As of mid-i95i, the relaxation had not as yet had any
appreciable effect on life insurance company investment activities.
Rather than attempting here a detailed account of the activities of all institutional
investors in the capital market, the role of such investors will be illustrated by refer-
ence to life and property insurance companies, commercial and mutual savings
banks, and savings and loan associations. From the standpoint of the capital market,
institutions which accept and invest a continuing flow of new funds and savings
are more significant than those which are engaged primarily in the management
of existing investment portfolios. Even among those institutions which do accept
new savings, however, there are some which have, for reasons either of size or re-
stricted activities, only a limited significance. Investment companies, for example,
though they supply both debt and equity capital, have not yet achieved a size which
lends the same importance to their role as suppliers of long-term credit as to that
of insurance companies or savings institutions. Public pension funds, on the other
hand, are substantial in size but, since their investments are largely restricted to
government securities, savings channeled into these funds are not directly available
for meeting private credit demands.
Private pension funds have not been singled out for discussionbecause published
data are not at present available in sufficient detail to permit analysis of their in-
vestment activities. This is unfortunate, since these funds represent the fastest
growing type of institutionalized saving. Some of them are administered by in-
surance companies; their resources are included with those of the administering
company and their investments are subject to the same, restrictions as those of the
insurance companies. Many private pension funds are administered by the sponsor-
ing company or by a trustee; these self-insured plans may be expected to supply a
rapidly growing volume of long-term funds, particularly equity capital.
7 N. Y. INs. LAw §8(i3).
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A. Selected financial institutions
The overwhelming predominance of long-term debt in the investment portfolios
of life insurance companies reflects the long-term character of their liabilities and
TABLE 2. AssETs oF SELECTED INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
(In billions of dollars)
Item1 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 19150
Life Insurance Companies'
Total ................................. 7.3 11.5 18.9 23.2 30.8 44.8 64.0
Government securities, total ............. 1.4 1.4 1.5 4.7 8.4 22.5 16.0
United States ....................... 0.8 0.7 0.3 2.9 5.9 20.6 13.4
State and local 2 ...................... 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.3 2.1 0.7 1.2
Foreign2 .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.2 1.4
Business securities, total ............... 2.03 3.1 5.3 5.8 9.2 11.1 25.4
Railroad bonds ...................... 1.7 2.2 2.9 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2
Public utility bonds .................. 0.1 0.7 1.6 2.1 4.3 5.2 10.6
Industrial and miscellaneous bonds .... 4 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.5 1.9 9.5
Stocks .............................. 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 2.1
Real estate mortgages, total ............. 2.4 4.8 7.6 5.3 6.0 6.6 16.1
Farm ............................... 1.3 2.0 2.1 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.3
Other .............................. 1.2 2.8 5.5 4.3 5.1 5.9 14.8
Real estate holdings .................... 0.2 0.3 0.5 2.0 2.1 0.9 1.4
Policy loans ........................... 0.9 1.4 2.8 3.5 3.1 2.0 2.4
Cash5 ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0.5 0.6 1.1 1.9 fl.0 0.8 1.0
Other assets5 .......................... 1.1 0.9 1.6
Property Insurance CompaniesG
Total ................................. 2.5 3.6 5.1 4.0 5.0 7.6 13.1
Government securities, total ............. 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.5 3.6 6.6
United States ....................... 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.2 3.2 5.3
State and local ...................... 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.1
Foreign ............................. 7 7 7 7 4 0.1 0.2.
Business securities, total ................ 1.2 1.9 3.2 2.1 2.2 2.8 4.0
Bonds .............................. 0.7 1.0 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.6
Stocks .............................. 0.5 0.9 1.7 1.2 1.6 2.4 3.4
Real estate mortgages .................. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other assets s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.1 2.4
'Unless otherwise noted, data are from Lnz Insmxc FACr BooK (Institute of Life Insurance 1951).2
For the years 1920-35, estimated from reports compiled by the Life Insurance Association of America covering 49 life insurance
companies.
3Total computed as a residual and components estimated from 1921 data.4Less than $50,000,000.
tFor the years 1940 and 1945, separation of miscellaneous assets as between "cash" and "other" is from Tim Spxcr.&Ton Lira INsa.
AzOcz YEAn Boos; for 1950 from THE TALLY (Institute of Life Insurance).
elOcludes fire, marine, casualty and surety companies. Data compiled from Thr SPzCrATOSt IsmlqNcz YAn Boom, Fire and Marine
and Casualty and Surety volumes. Life insurance assets of certain companies which also write property insurance are excluded through.
out. For the years 1920 through 1930, breakdowns of total assets are authors' estimates hased on 1930 reports of leading companies.
Foreign central government securities included with United States Government securities, foreign provincial with state and local
government securities.8
Includes cash, real estate holdings, and other admitted assets not shown separately.
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TABLE 2 (Cont.)
Item 1920 1192Z 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
Mutual Savings Banks 9
Total ................................. 5.8 8.1 10.6 11.2 11.9 17.0 22.4
Government securities, total ............. 1.5 1.8 1.5 2.6 3.8 10.6 11.0
United States ....................... 0.9 1.0 0.5 1.8 3.3 10.5 10.9
State and local ...................... 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1
Business securities5 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.2 1.6 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.2 2.1
Real estate mortgages .................. 2.4 4.1 5.8 5.1 4.8 4.3 8.0
Otherloans ........................... 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Cash ................................. 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.8
Other assets .......................... 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.4
Savings and Loan Associationsn
Total ............................... 2.2" 5.5 8.8 5.9 5.7 8.7 16.9
Real estate mortgages ................. 2.0 2  5.1 7.8 3.9 4.4 5.5 13.8
Real estate owned.................... 2o
U. S. Government securities ............ 1 2.4 1.5
Cash ................................ 0.2 0.4 .3 0.5 0.9
Other loans and investments ........... .8 0.8 4 0.1 0.3
Other assets ........................... 3 0.4
Commercial Banking System
Investments, total .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.0 17.9 21.7 27.1 31.9 127.0 108.7
U. S. Government securities .......... 3.8 4.9 6.4 16.4 19.9 114.9 82.8
Other ............................. 8.2 13.0 15.3 10.7 12.0 12.1 25.9
Federal Reserve System" .............. 0.3 0.4 0.7 2.4 2.2 24.3 20.8
Commercial banks, excluding trust
departments 5 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 17.5 20.9 24.8 29.7 102.7 87.9
Government securities, total .......... 4.5 6.1 7.9 16.8 21.5 94.6 70.1
United States .................... 3.5 4.5 5.6 14.0 17.8 90.6 62.0
State and local ................... 1.0 1.6 2.3 2.8 3.7 4.0 8.1
Real estate loans .................... 3.3 5.5 5.9 3.4 4.5 4.7 13.5
Other securities ...................... 3.9 5.9 7.1 4.6 3.7 3.4 4.3
OFigures for 1920 through 1945 are preliminary Federal Reserve revisions of Comptroller of the Currency data and represent averages
of June30 data; for 1950, major items from Federal Resee Bullein, others from National Association of Mutual Savings Banks.
'OIncludes emal amounts of Canadian Government bonds.
1 'Data, except as otherwise noted, are from Operating Analysis Division, Home Loan Bank Board.12Authors' estimates based on data for 1922.
13Includes U. S. Government security holdings of Federal Reserve System and investments and real estate loans of commercial banks;
excludes term loans.
"Holdings of United States Government securities, from RANtING AND MoNETARY STATRmPs, and FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
"5Figures for 1920 and 1925 are preliminary Federal Reserve revisions of Comptroller of the Currency data; for 1930-45 from ANNUAL
RPOR s OP THE COMPrOLTLR OF THE CURRENCY; for 1950 from ANNUAL REPOR OF TIM FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSUANCEC oRPORTION.
For 1920-35, end of year figures represent averages of June 30 figures.
Note: Details may not add to totals because of rounding. . ..
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statutory and supervisory restrictions which in general prohibit, or limit to a small
percentage of total assets, investments in corporate stocks. The diversification of life
insurance company investments is indicated by Table 2 which shows that, as of the
end of 195o, holdings of government securities, public utility bonds, industrial and
other business debt securities, and real estate mortgages each amounted to between
1o and 16 billion dollars.
The majority of life insurance company obligations are represented by long-term
contracts with policyholders; the companies' principal liquidity requirements are
definitely determinable for some time in advance on the basis of their contractual
obligations and their. mortality experience. Moreover, with a gross cash inflow that
currently is three to four times the amount of their annual benefit payments, there is
little need for holding highly liquid assets in order to meet policyholders' claims.
This combination of liabilities which are fixed in amount, staggered as to timing,
and statistically predictable, and of cash inflow in excess of cash outflow means that
life insurance companies can and do operate in the investment market on a longer-
term basis than would be feasible for most other institutional investors. Their most
pressing problem is that of finding sufficient investment outlets for the growing
volume of funds at teir disposal, and they may need to broaden their present outlets
to include larger amounts of corporate equities. Since there is little likelihood that
they would need to liquidate investments, yield rather than prospective market value
could be the more important consideration in their investment decisions.'
The investments of property insurance carriers, including fire, marine and
casualty companies, differ from those of life companies by being more liquid in
character and less restricted in type. Although the property companies generally
reinsure in order to spread the risk of localized disasters, they must still be prepared
to meet possibly large, though random and non-cumulative, demands from policy-
holders. Liquidity is therefore more important to them than to life insurance com-
panies and cash and government securities account for a much larger proportion of
their total assets. The statutory and supervisory restrictions under which property
insurance carriers operate are more lenient than those for life carriers, particularly in
regard to investment in business equities. At the end of i95o, property insurance
companies held one-fourth of their total assets in corporate stocks and only a nominal
proportion in real estate mortgages, while for life insurance companies, the distri-
bution as between these two types of higher-yield investments was exactly reversed.
The distribution of mutual savings bank assets reflects statutory limitations on
their investments as well as the relatively high degree of liquidity which must be
maintained in order to meet withdrawals which might be not only large but cumu-
lative. Cash and government securities represent more than 50 per cent of total
assets of this group of institutions. Reflecting statutory limitations, business security
holdings are confined largely to higher-grade corporate bonds and are a relatively
small proportion of total investments.
Badger, Unusual Features of Life Insurance Investing, 6 J. F1 NAcE 77-84 (June, x95!).
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The major investment activity of savings and loan associations is that of financing
home purchase or construction. Since their investments are generally limited by
statute and supervisory authorities to first mortgage loans on houses and small apart-
ments in the vicinity of the association and to United States Government obliga-
tions, savings and loan associations have virtually no role in corporate financing.
The investment activities of commercial banks differ in several important respects
from those of other financial institutions. First, and most important, commercial
banks have the power to create money; hence, they are not limited to a fixed volume
of loanable funds at any one time. During the war period, their purchases of
United States Government securities provided the Federal Government with a
substantially larger volume of funds than could be obtained from current savings
alone; during the postwar period, their sales of such securities to the Federal Reserve
System have provided a base for private credit expansion. Second, the predominantly
demand nature of commercial bank liabilities gives them probably the highest
liquidity requirements of any class of financial institutions. Third, unlike insurance
companies, their income is fully taxable and the tax-exempt securities of state and
local governments are particularly attractive to them. As a result of these factors,
and despite substantial sales of United States Government securities in the postwar
years, 7o billion of the 88 billion dollars of commercial bank investments (including
real estate loans) at the end of i95o consisted of federal and state and local 'govern-
ment securities.
IV
TiH EvoLvInG ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE CAPITAL MARKET
The series of economic and political developments which characterized the period
i92o-5o had a marked impact on the American capital market. For an analysis of
the changing role of institutional investors in that market, the 3o-year span may be
broken roughly into four periods of diverse economic developments and demands
for long-term funds; viz., io years (192i-3o) of relatively uninterrupted prosperity in
which private credit demand far exceeded that of the federal and state and local
governments combined; io years (1931-4 o) of severe economic depression followed by
slow recovery, during which Federal Government credit demands were substantial
and those of state and local governments relatively modest, while private credit
was reduced on balance; 5 years (1940-45) of rearmament and war, during which the
demands of the Federal Government completely overshadowed those of all other
groups; and finally, the postwar years 1946-5o, when the Federal Government reduced
the amount of its outstanding debt and private demands for long-term funds again
dominated the capital market.
Throughout all these periods, significant changes were taking place in the level
and structure of interest rates and in methods of business financing which both con-
tributed to and were the result of the growing importance of intermediary financial
institutions in the capital market. As the significant role of those institutions may
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best be illustrated by reference to the postwar period 1946-5o, the three earlier periods
will be discussed in broad perspective, and the postwar period in somewhat more
detail.
A. Financing of private credit demand during the twenties
Except for the deflationary aftermath of World War I, which lasted through most
of 1921, and the sharp decline in speculative stock prices that began in the fall of
1929 and foreshadowed a depression of major proportions, the period of the twenties
was one of general economic prosperity. It was characterized by a rising level of
industrial output, relatively high levels of private capital formation, and a gradual
easing of money market conditions that was reflected in a slow decline in long-term
interest rates.
Private credit expansion, totalling nearly 40 billion dollars and about equally
divided between real estate mortgage and long-term corporate debt, dominated the
capital market, as is shown in Table 3. On balance, there was no change in out-
standing public debt, the 8 billion dollar decrease in indebtedness of the Federal
Government offsetting the increase in that of state and local governments.
Two significant factors in this period not revealed by Table 3 were the extent of
foreign government and business security flotations in this country, and the im-
portance of external equity financing by domestic corporations. Foreign govern-
ments'and private business interests floated about 9 billions of new capital security
issues, compared with domestic new capital flotation, both public and private, totalling
TABLE 3. CHANGES IN SELECTED Fonius OF DEBT AND IN HOLDINGS OF SucH DEBT
BY MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS"
(In billions of dollars)
Item 1920-25 1925-30 1930-35 1935-40 1940-45 1945-50
Federal debt, changes in:
Total outstanding2 .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -3.5 -4.5 18.2 8.4 189.0 -45.4
Institutionalinvestor holdings' .......... 1.2 0.5 14.3 8.6 121.2 -37.7
State and local government debt, changes in:
Total outstanding4' 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4.4 4.4 2.5 0.9 -3.1 7.0
Institutional investor holdings3 .......... 0.7 1.3 0.9 1.4 -1.6 5.5
Corporate long-term debt, changes in:
Total outstanding4 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7.1 11.4 -7.5 0.1 -5.4 19.9
Institutional investor holdingsP 6 . . . . . . . .  3.8 4.4 -3.2 1.7 0.6 15.3
Real estate mortgage debt, changes in:
Total outstanding4 .................. 9.2 10.8 -8.6 0.2 -1.2 34.3
Institutional investor holdings3 .......... 9.4 7.6 -9.4 2.0 1.4 30.3
2Institutional investors conpre life and property insurance companies, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and
commercial and Federal P, eserve Banks.
2Gross direct and fully guaranteed debt available for purchase by private in.-titutional investors. Excludes adjusted service, dc-
pository, armed forces leave, and Series E savings bonds. Source: United States Treasury.
'Derived from Table 2.4Derived from Bonnell Public and Puirate Debt in 1950, SuRavE or CnerNv BusxzEss (U. S. Department of Commerce, September
1951).
Net debt, plus holdings of state and local trust funds; for 1920 and 1925 the latter have been estimated on the basis of the oct debt
Changes derived from June 30 figures.
GExclusive of commercial bank term loans to business corporations.
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54 billions. As far as domestic business corporations were concerned, preferred and
common stocks together accounted for two-fifths of their new capital security issues,
totalling 39 billion dollars.
Between the end of 192o and the end of i93o the combined resources of life and
property insurance companies, mutual savings banks, and savings and loan associa-
tions, and the investments of commercial banks doubled, rising from roughly 30
billion dollars to 65 billion. With outstanding federal debt declining, absorption by
this group of institutions of 1.7 billion of United States Government securities left
a smaller proportion than formerly in the hands of individuals. The amount of state
and local government debt taken by these institutions accounted for only 2.0 billion of
the 8.a billion increase in outstanding indebtedness. For the most part, these in-
vestors added relatively little to their holdings of foreign corporate and government
securities and domestic corporate stocks during this period.
These institutional investors did, however, absorb roughly two-thirds of the in-
crease in private domestic long-term indebtedness, accounting for a much larger
proportion of the placement of real estate mortgages than of long-term corporate
debt. To a great extent, this preference for real estate mortgages, and the restriction
of corporate investments to railroad bonds backed by property, reflected the pre-
vailing belief of the period that real property, rather than the present and prospective
earning capacity of industry, represented the optimum of investment value. It re-
mained for developments in the thirties and forties to demonstrate that idle farm
lands or the assets of debt-burdened companies in a declining industry were poor
security, and an even poorer source of income, as compared with the debenture bonds
of a young but growing manufacturing or public utility concern.
B. Developments during the thirties
The economic collapse of the early thirties resulted in almost complete stagnation
of private investment and mass unemployment and was accompanied by a marked
deterioration of investment values. The diverse effects of the depression on financial
institutions are illustrated in part by the decline or growth in their resources.
Savings and loan associations, which had placed much more emphasis upon mort-
gage investments than upon liquidity and conservative appraisal policies during the
twenties, saw their resources depleted by the decline in property values and with-
drawals by shareholders? At the same time, they were unable to attract new savings;
consequently, their total assets declined by nearly 3 billion dollars during the period
i931-35. On the other hand life insurance companies, whose greater diversification of
investments and modest liquidity requirements enabled them to weather the defla-
tion with much less difficulty, continued their rapid rate of growth even during the
first half of the thirties, adding some 4 billion dollars to their resources. In this
same period, total assets of mutual savings banks increased moderately, and in-
vestments of commercial banks rose substantially.
9 Strunk, The Improved Investment Positon of Savings and, Loan Associations, 2 J. FINANCE 1-21
(1947).
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By 1933 the tide of economic activity had ebbed so low that the Federal Govern-
ment and, to some extent, state and local governments were obliged to resort to
large-scale public works and relief programs in an effort to stimulate a recovery of
production and employment. Since tax revenues had declined along with business
and individuals' incomes, the financing of these programs necessitated what was for
those days a substantial amount of deficit financing. Thus, during the 5-year period
i931-35, the outstanding debt of the Federal Government increased by some i8
billion dollars, and the holdings of such debt by insurance carriers, savings insti-
tutions, and the commercial banking system increased by roughly 14 billion. On the
other hand, outstanding long-term corporate debt declined by 7.5 billion dollars and
non-corporate real estate mortgage debt by 8.6 billion during this period. Reflecting
liquidation of some of the debt which they held, writedowns of investment values,
and the small volume of new debt flotations, the combined long-term corporate
debt and real estate mortgage holdings of the major financial institutions decreased
by 12.6 billion dollars between the end of i93o and the end of 1935.
During the second half of the thirties, a smaller volume of Federal Govern-
ment security issues, and a moderate increase in the volume of long-term private
debt financing reflected the gradual but slow recovery from the depression. The
principal financial institutions were, on balance, acquiring securities from individuals
and other holders; additions to their portfolios exceeded the increase in public and
private debt outstanding by about 4 billion dollars.
Toward the close of the thirities changes in the distribution of individuals' in-
comes and in their savings and investment preferences, the rising importance of
intermediary financial institutions, increased government regulation of the securities
markets, and a rise in the cost of external equity relative to debt capital began to
have a marked effect upon the forms of corporate financing. For one thing, corpora-
tions began to rely more heavily on debt, and less on external equity financing. Pre-
ferred and common stocks, which together had accounted for two-fifths of corporate
new capital security issues during the twenties, amounted to less than one-fourth of
the 1936-4o total. For another, the proportion of corporate debt obligations which
were sold directly to certain financial institutions instead of being publicly offered
in the securities market rose substantially. Passage of the Securities Act of 1933
encouraged methods of financing which did not involve the delay and complexities
of registration.10 Moreover, growing competition among financial institutions for
investment outlets and the assured success of privately placed offerings further en-
hanced their attractiveness. The trend toward private placements which began in the
thirties continued on through the forties, and today they account for over half of
all new capital corporate debt issues.
"o Wilde, Pros and Cons of Direct Placement, The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, October g,
,951, p. 6.
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C. Financing the Government during World War II
War, and preparation for war, overshadowed all other economic developments
during the first half of the forties, and the financing requirements of the Federal
Government dominated the capital market. Between the end of 194o and the end of
1945 the oustanding gross federal debt increased by 239 billion dollars; of this amount,
as is shown in Table 3, 189 billion represented debt eligible for purchase by financial
institutions.
A marked expansion in individuals' incomes and reduction in the supply of con-
sumer goods and new housing resulted in a pronounced rise in savings, a large
part of which found its way into financial institutions; during the 5-year period
1941-45, the combined resources of life insurance companies, mutual savings banks,
and savings and loan associations increased nearly 50 per cent, while time deposits
of commercial banks doubled. Moreover, with the Government financing a large
proportion of business requirements for funds through construction of plant
facilities or by means of advance payments on war contracts, and with restrictions on
non-essential construction and use of materials, private demands for long-term credit
were not great enough to provide loan and investment outlets for more than a small
part of the increase in institutional investor resources.
With little choice but to invest funds at their disposal in Government securities,
insurance carriers and savings institutions added over 26 billion dollars, and com-
mercial banks 73 billion, to their holdings of Governments, while adding on balance
only 400 million dollars to their holdings of other public and private long-term debt.
As a group, insurance carriers, savings institutions, and commercial banks absorbed
about one-half of the increase in federal debt eligible for their purchase. At the
same time, their acquisition of other public and private debt, even though modest,
meant, in the face of a net reduction of 9.7 billion dollars in the total of such out-
standing debt, that the relative importance of these institutional investors as holders
of non-federal public and private debt increased even during World War II.
In the case of insurance carriers and savings institutions, wartime additions to
their holdings of United States Government securities exceeded only slightly the
growth in their resources, the greater part of which represented new savings. In
the case of commercial banks, however, wartime additions to Government security
holdings exceeded the increase in savings deposited with them, as represented roughly
by the growth in their time deposits, by almost 6o billion dollars. The expansion of
the money supply resulting from commercial bank purchases of Government securi-
ties in excess of new savings illustrates both the important role which these insti-
tutions play in the capital market as suppliers of funds, and the inflationary implica-
tions of extensive deficit financing.
The tremendous wartime expansion in institutional investor holdings of federal
debt was, as subsequent events proved, to have a marked impact on the postwar
capital market; first, because of the desire on the part of these institutions to increase
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the over all rate of return on their investments; second, because of the basis for
further credit expansion which sale of such securities to the Federal Reserve System
provided.
V
PosTWAR INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
The postwar capital market has been characterized by retirement of Federal
Government debt in excess of new borrowing, and by a marked expansion of private
long-term credit which has financed both a housing boom and a record volume of
business capital expenditures. Insurance carriers, savings institutions, and com-
mercial banks have provided the major part of this long-term credit. Analysis of
the postwar investment activities of these institutions indicates the dominance of their
current role in the American capital market, their undoubted influence on the
volume and form of long-term credit demands, and the impact of their activities on
the overall economy. Moreover, it reveals the extent to which their activities have
affected the efforts of the fiscal and monetary and credit authorities in managing the
public debt and curbing inflationary pressures.
At the end of World War II, all major types of financial institutions held a much
larger proportion of their investments in the form of Federal Government debt
obligations than had previously been the case. As a group, their holdings of such
securities at the end of 1945 accounted for 76 per cent of their total loans and invest-
ments, with commercial banks including the Federal Reserve System having the
highest proportion (9 per cent) and savings and loan associations the lowest (30
per cent).
Among all groups of institutional investors, the effect of large-scale wartime
acquisitions of United States Government securities had been to decrease the average
rate of return on their investment portfolios. For example, the average rate of
interest earned on the invested funds of all life insurance companies fell from 3.45
per cent in 1940 to 3.07 per cent in 1945, while the rate of return on loans and in-
vestments of commercial bank members of the Federal Reserve System declined from
2.94 per cent to 1.76 per cent. Consequently, financial institutions were anxious to
take advantage of opportunities for increasing the rates of return on their loan and
investment portfolios by acquiring higher-yield business securities and real estate
mortgages.
Given a substantial volume of United States Government securities in the hands
of institutions who felt compelled to increase the average rate of return on their
investments, and a volume of outstanding long-term private debt inadequate for
this purpose, it followed that these institutions could readjust their end-of-war port-
folios only through the willingness of others to absorb a larger proportion of federal
debt and through expansion of private credit.
With such a large volume of Federal Government debt outstanding at the end of
the war, both the postwar availability and cost of private credit have been influenced
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by credit and debt management policies of the central monetary and fiscal authorities.
Since it was generally felt that an assured market for Government securities was
essential to the success of subsequent Treasury financing operations and the main-
tenance of sound credit conditions, the Federal Reserve System continued its wartime
policy of maintaining a stable and orderly market for Government securities. Since,
under this policy, the prices of longer-term Government bonds were not permitted to
fall below par, their failure to adjust to normal competitive levels in the market meant
the preservation of somewhat lower interest rates on long-term funds than might
otherwise have prevailed. Moreover, the existence of an assured price for long-term
Governments meant that commercial banks, life insurance companies, and other
holders could dispose of them readily in order to obtain funds for meeting private
credit demands.
A. Postwar private credit demand
Private credit demands were not slow to assert themselves, once the wartime
restrictions on construction and the use of materials were relaxed sufficiently to
permit industrial and residential construction. Business concerns, whose plant ex-
pansion and improvement had been deferred during the war and whose productive
facilities were inadequate to meet current and prospective postwar demands, doubled
their expenditures on new plant and equipment between 1945 and 1946, and by 1948
reached a level of expenditure three times that of 1945. While a substantial part of
these expenditures was financed internally, large sums were obtained from the capital
market, the amount of corporate bonds and notes issued for new capital rising from
o.6 billion dollars in 1945 to 5.3 billion in 1948 and totalling 18.2 billion for the
period 1946-5o.
Individuals, whose purchases of houses had, as a result of the depression of the
thirties and the war, failed to keep pace either with the continuing need for replace-
ment of existing housing or the growth in number of families, entered the postwar
housing market in force. Both the number of new private dwelling units started and
the value of private residential construction rose sharply during the postwar period,
and with them the demand for real estate mortgage credit; during the period 1946-50,
new mortgage loans made on I- to 4-family houses alone totalled nearly 6o billion
dollars.
One factor which contributed greatly to the ready availability of real estate mort-
gage credit and influenced postwar capital market developments was the Govern-
ment guarantee of such credit through the Federal Housing Administration and
the Veterans Administration. The terms and conditions of both F.H.A. and V.A.
guaranteed real estate mortgage loans were more favorable from the standpoint of
the borrowers than those of conventional mortgages, the interest rate being lower
and the period of amortization longer. Thus, while the differential between yields
on United States Government securities and Government guaranteed mortgages was
less attractive to institutional investors than the spread between Government securities
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and conventional mortgages, the demands of individuals, coupled with Congressional
efforts to assure adequate housing for veterans, were sufficient to induce large scale
purchases by financial institutions of Government guaranteed mortgages.
B. Meeting long-term private credit demand
That institutional investors played a major part in meeting private demand for
long-term credit in the postwar period is indicated by a comparison of the growth in
real estate mortgage and corporate security holdings of insurance carriers, com-
mercial and mutual savings banks, and savings and loan associations with the
growth in private long-term debt. Between the end of 1945 and the end of i950
the real estate mortgage and long-term corporate debt holdings of these institutions
increased by nearly 46 billion dollars, with life insurance companies accounting for
nearly 23 billion, and commercial banks for nearly io billion, of the total. Thus, of
an increase of 54 billion dollars in long-term private debt during this same period,
these selected financial institutions accounted for more than four-fifths of the total.
Moreover, since commercial bank term loans are included in the total of long-term
corporate debt, but not in the investment and real estate mortgage holdings of com-
mercial banks, the importance of financial institutions as suppliers of long-term
private credit is understated to that extent.
As a group the principal financial institutions increased their investment in real
estate mortgages by 30 billion dollars between 1945 and i95o. Up until recently, a
substantial proportion of new purchases represented F.HA.- and V.A.-guaranteed
mortgages carrying interest rates somewhat below that of the traditional conventional
mortgage. Following the rise in long-term interest rates in early 195i, the relatively
low-yield Government-guaranteed mortgage lost favor in comparison with the higher-
yield conventional mortgage and with securities of lower yield on which no servicing
costs are involved. However, having previously entered into commitments to pur-
chase F.HA. and V.A. mortgages, financial institutions have continued to acquire
such mortgages despite the decline in yield differentials.
More than 17,billion dollars was invested in business securities by the major
financial institutions during the postwar period. The inability of most of these
institutions to purchase more than nominal amounts of corporate stock has been an
important factor in the prevalence of corporate debt financing and in the large volume
of equity financing done internally. Moreover, the relatively low interest rates at
which long-term funds have been made available to borrowers, as well as the de-
velopment of new, "custom tailored" financing methods have reflected the very great
investment desires of institutional investors relative to the demands of borrowers.
C. Development of new methods of financing
In the process of assuring investment outlets for their funds and in fulfilling post-
war business demands for long-term credit, institutional investors have encouraged
direct or private placements of debt obligations and have been active in the develop-
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ment of such new forms of long-term business financing as sale/lease-back and pur-
chase/lease arrangements.
Nearly one-half of all corporate bonds issued during the postwar period have
been negotiated directly with the lender; for the years 1948 through i95o the pro-
portions exceeded 5o per cent. 1 For various reasons, including requirements for
competitive bidding in the case of utility offerings, private placements have been
most important in the industrial field.
Life insurance companies are the principal suppliers of long-term corporate funds
via the private placement route, accounting for at least 9o per cent of the total. In
turn, private placements have accounted for at least 70 per cent of all bond acquisi-
tions by life insurance companies in each of the past 2 years' 2
Private placements are attractive to life insurance companies for several reasons.
The yield is often higher than that on comparable public offerings and, in pur-
chasing an entire issue, the institution can invest larger amounts in a single issue
than is generally feasible with publicly offered securities. Moreover, the fact that
the lender has an active role in negotiating the terms of the privately placed issue and
can make close and detailed analysis of the investment has definite advantages to an
investor such as a life insurance company.
Private placements can also be very advantageous to the borrower, despite the
fact that the higher interest cost which they carry may exceed the saving on flotation
cost. The delays and complications involved in registering an issue for public offer-
ing are eliminated, as is also the dependence on uncertain market conditions. In
tailoring a privately placed issue to meet the requirements of a single and experienced
investor, the borrower is often more likely to obtain terms suited to his own needs
than when an issue must be so set up as to appeal to many smaller and more varied
investors. Moreover, if the borrower at some later date wishes to change the size or
terms of the issue, the fact that the security was privately placed facilitates such
revisions. Thus, the increased popularity of private placements derives both from
their attractiveness to institutional investors and their advantages to corporate bor-
rowers.P3
In addition to the private placement of debt obligations, purchase/lease and
sale/lease-back arrangements have achieved some prominence in the postwar period
as methods of financing business requirements for long-term credit.' 4 Under these
arrangements, a financial institution buys equipment, constructs facilities, or purchases
existing facilities which it leases, usually on a 15- to 2o-year basis, to a business con-
cern, the leasehold providing for full amortization of the cost and generally con-
taining renewal and/or purchase options. The principal advantages of such leasing
arrangements to the business concern are: (i) retention of funds for other purposes
21 FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECUPRITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 219 (1949).
"Conklin, Direct Placements, 6 J. FINANCs 85-x8 ('95').
- Fraine, Direct Sale of Security Issues, i6 J. Am. Ass'N oF UNivE.SITY TEACHERS OF INSURANCE 40
(March 1949).
"L For further details see Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, A New Source of Investment for Life
Insurance Companies Provides a New Form of Corporate Financing, Monthly Review, October 31, 1948,
pp. 3-7.
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and (z) tax savings represented by the difference between annual leasehold and
depreciation charges.
D. Inflationary impact of postwar investment activities
While the longer-run effect of supplying investment funds for purposes of plant
expansion and home purchase is to reduce inflationary pressures by increasing output
and reducing the backlog of demand, the short-run effect in a period when demands
for goods and services of all types greatly exceed the available supply is to intensify
such pressures. The postwar combination of (i) extensive business demands for
new plant and equipment and individuals' demands for new housing, (2) large-
scale accumulations of liquid assets in the hands of businesses and individuals and
substantial resources in the hands of institutional investors seeking more remunerative
investment outlets than that provided by Government securities, (3) Government
action to assure adequate housing for veterans, and (4) a total output of goods and
services inadequate to fulfill total demand resulted almost immediately in rising
prices. In acting to increase the yield on their investment portfolios and to meet
private demands for long-term funds in excess of new savings, institutional in-
vestors could not help but contribute to short-run inflationary pressures during the
postwar period, especially as sales of Government securities to the Federal Reserve
System provided a basis for a multi-fold expansion of commercial bank credit.
While inflationary pressures of the earlier postwar period subsided somewhat
during 1949, they were subsequently renewed following the outbreak of the Korean
war and acceleration of the defense program. During the second half of 195o and
first few months of 1951 there was a record expansion of private credit that con-
tributed greatly to inflationary pressures and re-emphasized the need for monetary
and credit action. The program of credit restraint developed in response to this
need involved three types of measures. General credit restraint measures-
open market operations, changes in reserve requirements, and changes in the Federal
Reserve discount rate-were employed to curtail the total volume of credit available.
Selective credit measures, designed to discourage borrowers from utilizing particular
types, were applied in the consumer durable goods, housing, and stock market areas.
Finally, the cooperation of major groups of financial institutions was enlisted in an
effort to restrain voluntarily non-essential credit expansion.
Of these various measures, those which most directly affected the provision of
long-term funds and the investment activities of financial institutions were the control
of real estate mortgage credit, the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, and the
Federal Reserve System's discontinuing support through its open market operations
of Government bonds at fixed prices above par. The control of real estate mortgage
credit, by increasing downpayment requirements and shortening the repayment
period, operated to restrict individuals' use of such credit. The Voluntary Credit
Restraint Program, by focusing the attention of lending officers on the relationship
of credit expansion to economic stability and on the paramount importance of defense
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and defense-supporting uses of credit, facilitated the diversion of credit from non-
essential to essential purposes. Modification of the Federal Reserve System's open
market policy, by discouraging sales of Government securities for purposes of rein-
vesting the proceeds, has tended to restrict provision of additional long-term private
credit to the amount of new savings.
While selective control of real estate credit was introduced in the early fall of
195o, neither the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program nor modification of the
Federal Reserve System's open market policy were implemented prior to March
i95i. In the interim between the outbreak of the Korean war and the adoption of
the latter credit restraint measures, many financial institutions made commitments
to prospective borrowers to provide business and real-estate mortgage credit-com-
mitments that were legally binding upon both borrower and lender. As a conse-
quence of these existing commitments, neither the Voluntary Credit Restraint Pro-
gram nor the change in Federal Reserve open market policy had as immediate an
effect on the investment activities of financial institutions as might have been ex-
pected, though they undoubtedly brought about some curtailment of private long-
term credit extension shortly after their adoption. As of September 1951 there was in-
creased evidence of a shift from nondefense to defense and defense-supporting uses of
long-term credit, and of a decline in sales of Government securities for the purpose
of satisfying private credit demands.
VI
CONCLUSION
Over the past 30 years the importance of institutional investors as suppliers of
public and long-term private credit has increased appreciably. Their present dom-
inance in the American capital market stems not only from the magnitude of re-
sources at their disposal but also from the continued growth at record or near-
record rates in these resources which, together with funds made available from re-
payments of outstanding loans, assures a large and constantly increasing flow of long-
term credit. While continued growth in resources of all types of institutional in-
vestors may be presupposed, some like the private self-insured pension funds are
likely to grow more rapidly than others during the next 5 to io years.
The volume of institutional resources is so large relative to that of other invest-
ment funds that the activities of institutional investors can be expected to exert a
strong influence on the whole character of public and private long-term financing.
Among other things, the institutional investors may be expected to continue their
development of new methods and terms of financing especially suited to the needs
of individual business concerns. Since investment objectives, and legal and
economic factors governing investment decisions vary among different institutional
investor groups, the major ones are being discussed in further detail in subse-
quent articles in this symposium.
